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BANKRUPTCY
LEONARD H. GILBERT* AND ROBERT PASS**
The authors analyze developments in bankruptcy, including de-
cisions involving the rights of secured parties and lienors, juris-
diction of the bankruptcy courts, valuation of security, discharge,
preferences and newsman's and attorney-client privileges in
bankruptcy. The article also reports recent decisions interpreting
the Uniform Commercial Code as it pertains to bankruptcy. In-
cluded are a number of bankruptcy issues which recently have
been adjudicated for the first time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no Florida law of bankruptcy. While there exist some
state-provided avenues for the relief of distressed debtors, the term
"bankruptcy" connotes the body of federal statutory and decisional
law arising under the federal Bankruptcy Act.' The law surveyed in
this article is therefore largely federal.
This article does focus, however, upon Florida-related deci-
sions, i.e., the decisions of the federal bankruptcy judges and dis-
trict courts sitting in Florida, as well as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. There are three reasons for this em-
phasis. First, the Bankruptcy Act frequently looks to state law to
supply the rule of decision. In most cases, only the bankruptcy
courts sitting in Florida would apply Florida law. Second, Florida
creditors, Florida debtors, and Florida lawyers are assumed to be
among those most interested in what the bankruptcy courts in Flor-
ida are doing. Last, Florida is a very populous state, and the bank-
ruptcy courts sitting in it are among the busiest in the nation. It
therefore seems reasonable to proceed on the assumption that the
decisions of these courts are representative of the general develop-
ment and trend of bankruptcy law.
II. SECURED PARTIES AND LIENORS
A. Holders of Security Interests
1. FUTURE ADVANCES
In In re Howdeshell Plumbing, Inc.2 the court went behind the
clear "cross collateralization" or "future advances" language in two
security agreements to hold that subsequent debts incurred by the
debtor were not secured by the agreements.' The security agree-
ments were executed in connection with the debtor's purchase of
two vehicles. The debtor subsequently obtained a loan from the
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970). The Bankruptcy Act is referred to in this article as the
"Act." All citations herein are to the Act. A cross reference table to the U.S.C.A. appears at
11 U.S.C.A. XIV (1973).
2. No. 75-729 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 1976).
3. The security agreement, executed on standard UCC form 210, stated that it secured
"'any and all other liabilities or obligations . . . due or to become due. . . of each borrower
.. . to the Secured Party.'" Id. at 2. A second security agreement which used similar
language was executed on another item of collateral.
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same creditor. The debtor executed a promissory note, which pro-
vided for a description of collateral. The term "open" was typed into
the collateral description blank. No security agreement was exe-
cuted in connection with the latter loan.
Although the cross collateralization language of the original two
security agreements was unambiguous, the court found that the
series of transactions created enough ambiguity to require an exami-
nation of the intent of the parties. The court then concluded that it
was the intention of the parties to treat the subsequent loan as
unsecured, thereby negating the clear, literal import of the earlier
collateralization clauses. Relevant considerations were that the
creditor had carried the subsquent loan on its books as unsecured,
and that an executive vice president of the creditor had suggested
that the note should be renewed only on a secured basis.
Future advances clauses cause existing, identified collateral to
secure present and subsequent indebtednesses of the borrower. They
are "boilerplate" terms and are clearly enforceable.' However, the
Howdeshell court did not follow the literal meaning of the
"boilerplate" terms. Although it has been said that the intent of the
parties in making future advances has no bearing upon whether
such advances are subject to a prior future advances agreement,5 it
seems more reasonable, as the HowdesheU decision recognizes, to
effectuate the intent of the parties. One way this policy traditionally
has been accomplished is to recognize that, absent a clear expres-
sion of intent to the contrary, only a future indebtedness of the same
type as that which gave rise to the original agreement should be
presumed to be covered by the future advances clause.
4. State Bank v. United States (In re Riss Tanning Corp.), 468 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972);
Mason v. Avdoyan, 299 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
5. Barksdale v. Peoples Financial Corp., 393 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
6. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 401 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Tex. 1975). In
Kimbell Foods, the court observed that:
Section 9-204(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code . . . allows the creation
of clauses in an original security agreement that would secure future advances
made to the original debtor. However, these clauses will be closely scrutinized and
will be enforced only to the extent that future transactions or liabilities sought to
be secured were in the clear contemplation of the parties. The reason for this rule
is that this device can be abused when the lender seeks to bring in claims against
the debtor that were not originally contemplated by the parties. . . . The future
advances must be of the same class as the primary obligation and be so related
that the consent of the debtor may be inferred.
The true intention of the parties is really the sole and controlling factor in
19771
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This approach could have been the basis for the Howdeshell
decision. The court observed that it was satisfied that the parties
intended to deal on a "single loan" basis in financing the original
transactions. Yet, the Howdeshell court strove to refute the clear
language of the security agreements through subsequent conduct.
The decision therefore justifies increased care by the practitioner.
It militates strongly in favor of expressly identifying all subsequent
loans as secured by prior collateral when each new loan or advance
is made, particularly when the loan is of a different class or type
than those for which an earlier future advances clause was executed.
A sufficient notation of intent could be made in the documents
accompanying the subsequent advances; a new security agreement
should be unnecessary.
2. ASSIGNMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST
In Ritter v. Hughes,7 an arrangement proceeding, the debtor
purchased $300,000.00 worth of plants from the seller. The debtor
agreed to deliver a promissory note to the seller for the purchase
price. The note was to be endorsed with recourse by the seller to a
bank. A security interest in the plants was granted to secure the
purchase price. The security agreement provided that the security
interest in the plants would "'also . . . secure any other indebt-
edness of Buyer (debtor) to Seller.' ,, When the note was endorsed
to the bank, the security agreement between the debtor and the
seller purportedly was given to the bank was collateral. The assign-
ment stated that it gave the bank all of the seller's right, title, and
interest in the security agreement.
Except for the purchase price of the plants, the debtor was not
indebted to the seller at the time the security agreement was exe-
cuted. After the assignment to the bank, the seller sold more plants
to the debtor for over $55,000.00 and he was not paid.
determining what future advances were covered by the original agreement. If the
parties intended to deal on a single loan basis . . . then each new agreement
would have to be reperfected.
Id. at 325 (emphasis added). Accord, In re Dorsey Elec. Supply Co., 344 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D.
Ark. 1972) (intention to cover future advances which are not of the same class must be clearly
set forth in security agreement); John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State Bank, 55 Wis. 2d
385, 199 N.W.2d 161 (1972).
7. No. 75-1172 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 1976).
8. Id. at 1.
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The question presented in the proceeding was whether the
seller, when he created the $55,000.00 debt on the subsequent sale,
retained a security interest in the original plants which he had sold
to the debtor. The debtor contended that the seller did not retain
such an interest for three reasons; (1) The filed Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC) form reflecting the assignment of the seller's secu-
rity interest contained no statement that any security interest was
retained by him; (2) the original agreement did not grant a secu-
rity interest to the seller for future advances; and (3) the assign-
ment transferred all rights of the seller to claim the security interest
for an indebtedness arising after the assignment.
The court rejected all three contentions. With regard to the first
contention, the court noted that filing a notice of assignment under
section 9-405 of the UCC serves only as a notice to the public that
a security interest might be claimed by a third party, not as a
relinquishment of the assignor's security interest. Relying upon the
only reported decision on the question, Mills Morris Co. v. Scanlon
(In re King-Porter Co.),'0 the court held that the filing of the assign-
ment under section 9-405 did not operate to assign the security
interest over the contrary intention of the parties.
Concerning the contention that the original security agreement
granted no security interest for future advances, the court held that
the reference in the original agreement to "any other indebtedness"
had the same meaning as "any future indebtedness" in view of the
surrounding circumstances. When the original agreement was exe-
cuted, there was no other indebtedness between the debtor and the
seller. The only other indebtedness between the parties would have
9. Florida Statutes section 679.405 (1975), which is not identical with the 1962 revised
Uniform Commercial Code text, provides. in pertinent part that:
(1) A financing statement may disclose an assignment of a security interest
in the collateral described in the statement . ...
(2) A secured party may assign of record all or part of his rights under a
financing statement by the filing of a separate written statement of assignment
(3) After the disclosure or filing of an assignment under this section, the
assignee is the secured party of record.
(Emphasis added).
10. 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971). The court in Mills observed that: "[U]pon filing a
notice of assignment of a security interest under the Code, the designated assignee becomes
the secured party of record. . . . This procedure cannot, nor was it intended to, work a
substantive assignment where none was intended by the parties." Id. at 728 (emphasis in the
original).
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to arise from a future advance.
Finally, the court rejected the contention that the assignment
to the bank transferred the seller's right to hold a security interest
on any future indebtedness. The court found that the assignment
was "conditional"; if the bank were not paid by the debtor, and the
seller then were required to pay any portion of that obligation, the
security agreement would revert to the seller. As a result, there was
no final and irrevocable transfer of the seller's security interest in
future advances made by him to the debtor.
The rationale employed by the court in holding that no assign-
ment occurred requires some scrutiny. Section 9-405(1) of the UCC
provides that "an assignment of a security interest" may be
"disclose[d]" in a financing statement. Section 9-405(3), upon
which the Ritter and Mills decisions relied, states that "after the
disclosure or filing of an assignment under this section, the assignee
is the secured party of record."" It seems clear that the UCC provi-
sions contemplate that an actual or substantive assignment occur
before filing a separate financing statement giving record notice of
the assignment. The official comment to section 9-405 states that
the
section provides a permissive device whereby a secured party who
has assigned all or part of his interest may have the assignment
noted of record. . .. After a secured party has assigned his rights
of record, the assignee becomes the 'secured party of record' and
may file a continuation statement . . a termination statement
. . . or a statement of release .... 11
Once the transfer provisions of section 9-405 are satisfied, the as-
signee, now the secured party of record, apparently can extinguish
the perfected nature of the assignor's interest (assuming one was
retained) by filing a termination statement,'3 or by a release of the
collateral.14
The Ritter and Mills decisions indicate that section 9-405 pro-
vides only a permissive device allowing the putative assignee to
release collateral or to terminate the recorded security interest.
However, a section 9-405 filing may have an important effect on the
11. U.C.C. § 9-405(3) (emphasis added).
12. U.C.C. § 9-405, Comment (emphasis added).
13. FLA. STAT. § 679.404 (1975).
14. FLA. STAT. § 679.406 (1975).
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assignee. Although under section 9-302(2) an assignee need not file
a notice of assignment to maintain the perfected nature of his secu-
rity interest against the debtor's creditors, he must file a notice of
assignment in order to maintain that perfection against creditors of
the assignor."8 It is therefore strongly in the interest of only a true
assignee to file under section 9-405. If there were no real assignment
of the security interest, perfection would continue in the original
secured party, and the assignee, when he truly became an assignee,
would be protected at the time of assignment against all otherwise
junior creditors."'
The court in Mills noted that an erroneously filed notice of
assignment would not mislead creditors, since it indicates only that
the secured party of record may hold an interest in certain collat-
eral. Further inquiry by creditors is anticipated "to disclose the
complete state of affairs."' 7 However, there is no good reason to file
under section 9-405 when there has been no substantive assignment
of the security interest. Even the Mills court recognized that it was
erroneous to do so. 8 In addition, because of the potential for confu-
sion and the desirability of avoiding unnecessary filings, the courts
should not be so willing to find no assignment in fact when there
has been one of record.
3. RECLAMATION RIGHTS OF SELLER
In Kennedy v. Texas Meat Packers Corp.,"° the court rejected
a seller's attempt to reclaim goods under UCC section 2-702, despite
the seller's claim that he made a timely demand that proved futile.
The court held that the bankruptcy trustee had a superior claim to
the goods. The plaintiff sold and delivered meat to a buyer when the
buyer was insolvent. Within ten days of delivery of the merchandise,
the seller visited the offices of the bankrupt in an attempt to recover
the merchandise or collect the purchase price. The premises were
vacant. The seller did nothing more within the ten day period to
reclaim the goods.
15. FLA. STAT. § 679.302 (1975).
16. See Epstein, Security Transfers By Secured Parties, 4 GA. L. REv. 527, 528-29 (1970).
17. Mills Morris Co. v. Scanlon (In re King-Porter Co.), 446 F.2d at 729; accord, U.C.C.
§ 9-402, Comment 2.
18. 446 F.2d at 729.
19. No. 76-858 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 1976).
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The purchaser later filed in bankruptcy, and the seller again
attempted to reclaim the merchandise under UCC section 2-702.s
It was conceded that the seller did not make a personal demand
upon the buyer within ten days of the buyer's receipt of the mer-
chandise as required by section 2-702. The seller argued that he was
excused from strict compliance with the UCC, because he went to
the bankrupt's premises within ten days, but could not make a
demand since the premises were vacant. The court disagreed, point-
ing out that the seller retained ownership of the goods until final
payment was made, and that he could have perfected his interest
by filing a financing statement within the ten day period. The court
indicated strongly that it viewed the ten day rule contained in sec-
tion 2-702 as absolute.
In so ruling, the court relied upon Stowers v. Mahon (In re
Samuels & Co.)."' In Stowers, the Fifth Circuit held originally that
strict compliance with the ten day limitation period of section 2-702
was unwarranted because the goods to be reclaimed (cattle) were
immediately butchered and placed with other fungible, butchered
carcasses, making futile a demand for their return.2 On rehearing
en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed its decision and adopted the
dissenting opinion of Judge Godbold. Judge Godbold argued that
compliance with the Code's ten day provision is an absolute require-
ment: "There is no exception in the Code Sections or Comments,
express or implied, to the statutory period. . . .The spirit in which
the rule was broken seems to me irrelevant.""
The Stowers and Texas Meat Packers decisions evidence an
increasingly severe judicial view of the seller's reclamation rights
under section 2-702. The Stowers case appeared to make the ten day
provision of the section a simple, absolute requirement. The court
in Texas Meat Packers furthered the strict compliance approach by
requiring the seller to perfect promptly a security interest through
the Code's filing provision if actual demand could not be made. The
20. FLA. STAT. § 672.702 (1975). This section provides in pertinent part:
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand within 10 days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller
in writing within 3 months before delivery the 10 day limitation does not apply.
21. 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'g en banc 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975).
22. 510 F.2d at 148.
23. 526 F.2d at 1245.
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court observed that "[ijf, in each case of no demand, the Court
would have to make a determination as to the ten day rule being
applicable, that time limit would soon have no effect." 4
The admonition has become reinforced; actual demand for re-
turn must be made within ten days of delivery to an insolvent buyer
,or the seller's interest must be perfected by filing. Even diligent
search and inquiry, where fruitless, will not suffice. It should also
be noted that even if demand is timely, one may severely prejudice
or waive his reclamation right by failing to "follow up" the demand
by a bona fide attempt to reclaim the merchandise."
Regardless of compliance by a seller with section 2-702, unre-
solved questions remain. Section 67(c)(1)(A) of the Act 6 invalidates
all statutory liens "which first becomes effective upon the insol-
vency of the debtor . . . ... It has been held that section 67(c)(1)(A)
invalidates rights acquired under the reclamation provisions of the
UCC as against the trustee. 7 Since UCC section 2-702 takes effect
only if the buyer is insolvent, it has been held that section 2-702 has
no application in bankruptcy against the trustee.28 However, the
matter has been the subject of considerable disagreement.
In addition, section 70c of the Act gives a trustee the same
powers and status as a hypothetical lien creditor under state law at
the time of filing under the Act. Under a literal reading of Florida
Statutes section 672.702(3) (1975), the unpaid seller loses to the
trustee, who assumes the position of a lien creditor. In order to
avoid such a result, some states have dropped the "lien creditor"
language of UCC section 2-702(3).3° Most states, including Florida,
24. No. 76-858, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 1976).
25. Bar Control v. Grifford (In re Colacci's of America, Inc.), 490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.
1974).
26. Section 67(c)(1)(A) provides: "The following liens shall be invalid against the trus-
tee: (A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of the debtor
27. Carnation Plastic Mfg. Co. v. Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
28. In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887 (D.N.J. 1974); In re Federal's,
Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973). See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.281, at 420-
21 (14th ed. Moore & Oglebay 1975); J, WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COnE, §
7-15, at 241-45 (1972).
29. Contra, In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. 61 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
30. WHnTE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 244 n.101. These changes were in reaction to In
re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960), which held that since the UCC does not spell out the
priority between an unpaid seller and another lien creditor, resort to the forum's common law
was necessary. The forum law in Kravitz made the lienor the party of higher priority.
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have not dropped this language; nor has the Permanent Editorial
Board for the UCC done so. It is contemplated that, under general
principles of law, the unpaid seller would prevail over the lien credi-
tor. The Code says only that the unpaid seller's right to reclamation
is "subject to" the rights of a lien creditor.3 The Code does not
define the rights of a lien creditor. In any event, the reclaiming
seller's interest is not a preference under section 60a of the Act.32
4. SECURITY AGREEMENTS BY INFERENCE
In In re Babb, Inc., 3 an arrangement proceeding, the court
authorized a creditor to repossess substantial assets of the debtor.
Although a formal security agreement was never executed, the court
found the creditor to be secured. In so doing, the court effectuated
the language in a financing statement evidencing an intent to secure
the creditor by the debtor's assets. The holding affirmed the princi-
ple which was employed recently in Morey Machine Co. v. Great
Western Industrial Machine Co.34 The court in Morey noted that the
UCC does not "require. . .that the financing statement be a sepa-
rate piece of paper from the security agreement, or that any particu-
lar words be used to evidence the security interest."' 5 In Morey, the
court held that the simple observation in a financing statement that
documentary stamps had been placed on the promissory instru-
ments "secured hereby" was sufficient to create a security agree-
ment.36
In normal commercial practice a security agreement is a docu-
ment separate from a financing statement. It has been held, how-
ever, that a financing statement may serve as a security agreement,
if the statutory requirements of UCC sections 9-105(1)(h) and 9-
203(1)(b) are satisfied. 7 Thus, in Nolden v. Plant Reclamation (In
31. U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
32. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCy, supra note 28, 60.18.
33. No. 75-112 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 1976).
34. 507 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1975).
35. Id. at 988. Florida Statutes section 679.203 (1975) provides in pertinent part that:
"A security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless .. t.. Ithe
debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral . .. ."
Florida Statutes section 679.105 (1975) defines a "security agreement" as "an agreement
which creates or provides for a security interest."
36. 507 F.2d at 890.
37. Nolden v. Plant Reclamation (In re Amex-Protein Dev. Corp.), 504 F.2d 1056 (9th
Cir. 1974); Evans v. Everett, 183 S.E.2d 109 (N.C. 1971).
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re Amex-Protein Development Corp.),38 the court held that a prom-
issory note which contained an acknowledgement that it was se-
cured by a security interest in certain property was sufficient to
establish a security interest in that property.39 A security agreement
also has been found where a letter accompanying a promissory note
stated that "the above arrangements are in accordance with our
loan agreement" and the oral loan agreement was proved to contain
the grant of a security interest.10
Such decisions represent the salvation of a careless creditor,
particularly in bankruptcy, where the difference between a secured
and unsecured creditor could not be greater. However, the informed
creditor will execute a formal security agreement at the outset, thus
eliminating the necessity of reliance upon marginal or offhand refer-
ences or notations to "security." Absent a recognizable security
agreement, the security interest and its scope must be proved by the
party seeking to enforce it.
5. NON-CODE SECURITY INTERESTS
A rarely litigated question was presented in Hughes v. Russo
(In re Equitable Development Corp.)." A bankrupt corporation bor-
rowed money from Russo. The loan was evidenced by a note which
was secured by a mortgage on realty, by a security pledge agree-
ment, and by an assignment of accounts receivable. The pledge
agreement and assignment of accounts receivable gave the lender
the right to obtain proceeds from contracts for the sale of land. No
financing statement was filed by Russo at the time, and none was
filed until after the petition in bankruptcy.
The trustee sought to invalidate as preferences Russo's claimed
interests in the proceeds of the land sales contracts. The trustee
argued that since no financing statement was filed by Russo before
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, under section 60a(2) of the
Act the security interest was "transferred" immediately prior to the
petition, thereby making the "transfer" a voidable preference. Sec-
tion 60a(2) provides that, for preference purposes, "a transfer of
38. 504 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1974).
39. Accord, In re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d 1328 (1st Cir. 1973).
40. Nunnemaker Transp. Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 456 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1972). See In
re Penn Housing Corp., 367 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Pa. 1973); In re Carmichael Enterprises, Inc.,
334 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1972).
41. No. 75-751 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 1976).
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property other than real property. . . shall be deemed to have been
made . . . when it becomes so far perfected that no subsequent lien
. ..obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple con-
tract could become superior to the rights of the transferee." 12 The
section further provides that if any transfer of personalty is not so
perfected prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, it "shall be
deemed to have been made immediately before the filing of the
petition" and thus would be voidable under the four month prefer-
ence rule. Russo contended that the security and pledge agreement
and the assignment of accounts receivable gave him an "interest in
land" which was not governed by the UCC. He claimed he had
become secured at the time of the original transaction, which was
prior to the start of the Act's preference period. The trustee argued
that Russo obtained only an interest in personalty which was not
"perfected" except by operation of the automatic "transfer" provi-
sions of section 60a(2).
So framed, the issue was whether a security interest in con-
tracts for the sale of land was subject to the filing requirements of
Article 9 of the UCC. The court held that such an interest was
within Article 9 and subject to UCC filing requirements, thereby
allowing the trustee to prove a preference.
Florida Statutes section 679.104(10) (1975), excludes from Arti-
cle 9 "an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents
thereunder."43 Official comment 2 to UCC section 9-104(j), the
counterpart to section 679.104(10), makes clear that Article 9
"applies only to security interests in personal property."" Section
679.102(1)(a) expressly provides that Article 9 governs security in-
terests in "personal property . . .accounts or contract rights."4"
Section 679.102(3) states that the application of Article 9 to "a
security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the fact
that the obligation is itself secured by [an] . . .interest" to which
the Article does not apply."
These provisions, as well as the decision in Riebe v. Budget
Finance Corp.," were relied upon by the Russo court in its decision
42. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(2).
43. FLA. STAT. § 679.104(10) (1975).
44. U.C.C. § 9-104(j), Comment 2. Special provision is made, however, for security
interests in fixtures. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.104(10), 679.313 (1975).
45. FLA. STAT. § 679.102(l)(a) (1975).
46. FLA. STAT. § 679.102(3) (1975).
47. 264 Cal. App. 2d 576, 70 Cal. Rptr. 654 (Ct. App. 1968).
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that the security and pledge agreement and the assignment of ac-
counts receivable represented nothing more than security interests
in personalty - contract rights - which were within Article 9. The
fact that the contracts from which the security interest arose were
for the sale of land wag held irrelevant. Russo is in accord with
official comment 4 to section 9-102(3) of the Code:
The owner of Blackacre borrows $10,000 from his neighbor, and
secures his note by a mortgage on Blackacre. This Article is not
applicable to the creation of the real estate mortgage. Nor is it
applicable to a sale of the note by the mortgagee, even though the
mortgage continues to secure the note. However, when the mort-
gagee pledges the note to secure his own obligation to X, this
Article applies to the security interest in an instrument even
though the instrument is secured by a real estate mortgage
48
Thus, all creditors except those whose notes are secured by true
mortgages on real estate should take all steps necessary under the
Code to perfect their security interests. Even notes secured by deeds
of trust on real property may be within Article 9.4s Cases in other
jurisdictions, seemingly in conflict with Russo, have held that notes
secured by leases of real property are outside Article 9, even though
the immediate security for the note is essentially a contract. 0
6. VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION BY SECURED CREDITORS
It has been stated that the central purpose of an arrangement
under chapter XI of the Act is to "secure judicial confirmation to
an arrangement, or adjustment, of a debtor's unsecured obliga-
tions."'" Section 356 of the Act, governing the contents of an ar-
rangement, requires a plan to include provisions modifying or alter-
ing only the rights of unsecured creditors. The rights of secured
creditors are not part of the plan. It has been said that "[n]o
48. U.C.C. § 9-102(3), Comment 4 (emphasis added).
49. Cf. Id..
50. In re Bristol Ass'n, 505 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1974) (lease of store); Ingram v. Ingram,
521 P.2d 254 (Kan. 1974) (oil and gas lease is realty under state law). However, an interest
in a land trust, generally held to be personalty under state law, has been held to be within
Article 9. Levine v. Pascal, 236 N.E.2d 425 (Ill. App. 1968).
51. RIDC Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 492 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis
added), citing SEC v. American Trailer Rentals, 379 U.S. 594, 605 (1965) and SEC v. U.S.
Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 445 (1940).
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provision of the Act permits the plan proposed under Chapter XI.
to deal with the rights of secured creditors."52
A secured creditor has a number of options which are unavaila-
ble to the unsecured creditor. He may disregard the arrangement
proceeding altogether, file no claim, and rely upon his security if it
is in his possession." He may file a secured claim against the estate
if the security for the debt owed to him is within the jurisdiction of
the court.54 He may surrender or waive his security and prove his
claim as an unsecured claim, or he may avail himelf of his security
and share in the general assets as to the unsecured balance." Gener-
ally, the secured creditor enjoys the option of staying out of the
arrangement or getting involved in varying degrees. He cannot be
forced to participate.
Section 16 of.the Act provides that the liabilities of the bank-
rupt's guarantors or sureties are not altered by the bankrupt's dis-
charge. This section makes clear that a discharge affects only the
personal liability of the debtor, not those against whom his creditors
were entitled originally to look for payment of the discharged debt."
These established principles recently came together in RIDC
Industrial Development Fund v. Snyder.57 RIDC, a secured creditor,
sued the guarantor of a debt which was discharged as to the debtor
through an arrangement. Two credit transactions were executed
originally between RIDC and the debtor. Both were secured by
property of the debtor. The guarantor executed guaranties for both.
Subsequently, the debtor was acquired by another corporation. In
connection with the acquisition, a new agreement which modified
the original security agreement was executed. The modification was
accomplished with the consent of the guarantor.
In the debtor's subsequent arrangement proceeding, RIDC was
involved voluntarily as a participant in the plan. The guarantor was
not consulted. The plan provided in part that any indebtedness
owed to secured creditors who executed a consent to the plan were
52. 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, 8.01[3], at 168, quoted in In re Texas
Consumer Fin. Corp., 480 F.2d 1261, 1265 (5th Cir. 1973).
53. United States Nat'l Bank v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 331 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1947); In re
Pennyrich Int'l Inc., 473 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
54. 331 U.S. at 33-34; 473 F.2d at 421.
55. 331 U.S. at 33-34; 473 F.2d at 421.
56. See Merrit-Holland Welding Supplies, Inc. v. General Steel Tank Co., 478 F.2d 294
(4th Cir. 1973); 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, 16.
57. 539 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1976).
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to be cancelled, discharged, and extinguished and that the arrange-
ment, when confirmed, would supersede the security agreement.
After discharge of the debtor, RIDC sued the guarantor. The
guarantor argued that he was discharged from his guaranty because
RIDC's participation in the plan cancelled and extinguished the
principal debt without his consent. RIDC argued that section 16 of
the Act reserved its rights against the guarantor. The guarantor's
answer was that because RIDC participated in the plan as a secured
creditor and chapter XI has been held not to deal with secured
creditors, RIDC's legal rights were not protected by section 16. He
argued further that since the debt owed to RIDC was not discharged
under the coercive effect of the bankruptcy court, the discharge of
the principal obligation was purely voluntary. This fact, the guaran-
tor argued, operated to discharge him under general principles of
guaranty.
The district court agreed. It held that since RIDC, a secured
creditor, participated in the plan without relinquishing its security,
"the plan of arrangement could not affect the legal rights of the
plaintiff in the manner provided for [in section 16]."1 The court
relied upon the decision of the Fifth Circuit in In re Texas Consumer
Finance Corp. ,5 where the court observed: "No provision of the Act
permits an arrangement proposed under Chapter XI to deal with the
rights of secured creditors .... [O]nly the rights of the debtor's
unsecured creditors may be arranged under Chapter XI." The dis-
trict court concluded that RIDC was a "secured creditor" even
though the debtor had conveyed the collateral to the acquiring cor-
poration. 0 Having concluded that RIDC was a secured creditor and
that the plan of arrangement could not therefore coercively affect
58. 387 F. Supp. 466, 470 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
59. 480 F.2d 1261, 1265 (5th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted).
60. This conclusion was not based upon the definition of a "secured creditor" under
section 1(28) of the Act, but upon section 9-105(1)(i) of the UCC. The Code section defines a
"secured party" as a "lender ... in whose favor there is a security interest." Comment 2 to
section 9-105(1)(i) observes that property is sometimes transferred subject to a secured debt,
but that such a transfer does not necessarily render the original secured party unsecured. On
the other hand, section 1(28) of the Act states that a "secured creditor" is a creditor who has
security for his debt "upon the property of the bankrupt." This implies that once the collat-
eral leaves the ownership of the bankrupt, as in the instant case, the creditor is no longer
secured. Even though the district court applied an erroneous standard in determining secured
creditor status, the Fifth Circuit found that sufficient collateral had been retained by the
debtor to satisfy section 1(28), and agreed that RIDC was a secured creditor under the proper
standards.
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RIDC's rights, the district court further concluded under the com-
mon law of guaranty that the guarantor was released by the arrange-
ment because it materially altered the principal obligation.
The Fifth Circuit reversed and expressly limited the broad
statement made in Texas Consumer Finance concerning the effect
of a plan upon secured creditors. The court pointed out that Texas
Consumer Finance did not involve a secured creditor who voluntar-
ily participated in the plan, but rather an attempt by the bank-
ruptcy court to impose upon preferred shareholders a requirement
that they surrender their shares prior to confirmation of the plan.
In limiting the effect of Texas Consumer Finance, the Fifth Circuit
recognized that chapter XI arrangements may deal with the rights
of secured creditors to the extent that they deal with the claims of
secured creditors for the excess due to them over the value of their
security. More importantly, the court concluded that a bankruptcy
court has both jurisdiction to impose restrictions on secured credi-
tors prior to confirmation and authority to deal with the rights of
secured creditors to the extent that they voluntarily agree to the
arrangement.
In other words, the court in RIDC gave effect to the policy of
encouraging secured creditors not to seek foreclosure of their secu-
rity, but to participate in an arrangement under which they would
receive compensation equal to their security interests." Since RIDC
participated in the arrangement not just to the extent it was unse-
cured, but completely, the court held that even though the bank-
ruptcy court was without jurisdiction to compel a secured creditor
to participate in an arrangement altering his security interests, the
secured creditor was totally free to do so and could do so without
sacrificing his section 16 rights. As a result, the court held that the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to alter RIDC's secured creditor
status, with RIDC's consent, and that it did so without prejudicing
RIDC's other statutory rights. Thus RIDC was allowed to pursue the
guarantor under section 16.
The decision in RIDC sends to an early grave the unfortunately
broad language in Texas Consumer Finance. The decision serves an
important policy of encouraging, but not compelling secured credi-
tors to participate in the plan of arrangement, in order to maintain
the going concern value of the debtor, rather than to seek foreclosure
61. 539 F.2d at 493.
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of the debtor's assets. Although there may be circumstances in
which the secured creditor is compelled by business reasons to par-
ticipate in the plan anyway, the decision correctly saves to the se-
cured creditor his rights to proceed against the debtor's guarantors,
comakers, and sureties, notwithstanding his participation in the
plan. Since the Act reserves for the unsecured creditor (who is effec-
tively compelled to participate in the plan) the saving effect of
section 16, it would make little sense to penalize the secured creditor
who voluntarily participates in a plan by depriving him of the effect
of section 16.
The RIDC decision does not address the case of the secured
creditor who chooses to participate in the plan by waiving his secu-
rity and proceeding as an unsecured creditor. Although such partici-
pation by the creditor would necessarily extinguish his status as a
secured creditor and therefore his right to proceed against collateral,
section 16 should still apply. Any other result would be contrary to
the established meaning of section 16,12 and to the policy just noted.
B. Lessor's and Landlord's Liens
1. PRIORITY OF LANDLORD'S LIEN
In Avdoyan v. Small Business Administration (In re Brunet),3
the court for the first time held that the "relating back" effect of
the Florida Landlord Lien Law was ineffective to give the landlord
priority over a lien that vested in fact after the time the landlord's
lien vested under state law. The trustee had preserved the landlord's
lien for the estate under the appropriate provisions of the Act. 4 The
Small Business Administration (SBA) obtained a security interest
in the debtor's property by assignment after the commencement of
tenancy under the lease, but prior to any default. The trustee in-
voked the Florida Landlord Lien Law, which ficticiously relates
back the landlord's lien for rent upon the lessee's property to the
first time the property was first brought onto the leased premises.6 5
62. See 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, 16.05.
63. No. 75-288 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 1976).
64. Section 67c(1)(C) of the Act provides that statutory liens for rent and liens for
distress of rent, whether statutory or not, are invalid against the trustee. However, section
67c(2) empowers the court to preserve any of the liens which are rendered invalid against the
trustee.
65. FLA. STAT. § 83.08(2) (1975). This section provides:
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The court held that the "relating back" effect of the Florida law
was inconsistent with the federal common law notion of choate
liens, and was therefore ineffective to give the landlord a lien prior
to the time it became choate. Under federal law, an inchoate lien is
a lien in which the certainty of amount, exact identity of the lienor,
and time of attachment must await future determination." The
court thus held that the SBA lien was superior to the landlord's lien
held by the trustee. The fact that the SBA did not acquire the lien
until after the debtor was adjudicated bankrupt was unimportant
since the SBA lien was choate in the hands of its assignor prior to
the vesting of the landlord's lien.
Avdoyan does not eliminate the "relating back" effect of the
landlord's lien for all purposes in bankruptcy. The federal test of
choateness is applied when at least one lien at issue is that of a
federal governmental entity." Federal law determines priority of a
federal government lien, whatever its source." However, when no
federal interests are at stake, the validity, nature, and effect of a
state lien is still governed by state law.69
2. TERMINATION RIGHTS OF LESSOR
Section 70b of the Act recognizes expressly the enforceability
of lease forfeiture provisions which terminate a lease upon bank-
ruptcy.70 Despite this seemingly unequivocal language, the United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that, at least in reorganiza-
Landlord's Lien for Rent. - Every person to whom rent may be due ... shall
have a lien for such rent upon the property found upon or off the premises leased
or rented, and in the possession of any person, as follows:
(2) Upon all [non-agricultural] property of the lessee or his sublessee or
assigns, usually kept on the premises. This lien shall be superior to any lien
acquired subsequent to the bringing of the property on the premises leased.
See also, Lovett v. Lee, 193 So. 538 (Fla. 1940); GMAC Corp. v. Noni, Inc., 227 So. 2d 891
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Taft St. Shopping Center, 184 So. 2d 210
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
66. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954); United States v. White, 325 F.
Supp. 1133, 1135 (S.D.W. Va. 1971); Stein v. Moot, 297 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D. Del. 1969).
67. United States v. Oswald & Hess Co., 345 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1965).
68. United States v. Securities Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950); United States v.
Oswald & Hess Co., 345 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1965).
69. Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1955).
70. Section 70b provides in pertinent part: "An express covenant that . the bank-
ruptcy of a specified party . . . shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election
to terminate the same is enforceable."
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tion proceedings, the statute does not dispense with the common
law's disfavor of forfeitures. The Court has directed that the en-
forceability of such provisions be weighed against the public interest
in obtaining a successful reorganization."
In addition, the courts generally have evidenced a disinclina-
tion to enforce such forfeiture provisions when enforcement would
substantially impair or deprive the bankrupt of its principal asset,
thereby frustrating the arrangement, reorganization, or bank-
ruptcy." Courts have also frequently achieved the same results
under state law by finding that the landlord had waived his contrac-
tual rights to enforce a forfeiture clause,73 or by a technical applica-
tion of state law regarding the terms of the forfeiture provision.74
However, in Conqueror Films, Inc. v. Camelot Entertainment,
Inc. ,5 the court permitted the enforcement of a forfeiture provision,
even though enforcement deprived the debtor of its sole "asset."
The debtor was the lessee of a motion picture. The motion picture
constituted the lessee's sole method of earning money to pay its
creditors in the arrangement proceeding. The lease agreement pro-
vided that it would terminate automatically in the event the lessee
availed itself of any remedy under the Act. Upon the initiation of a
chapter XI proceeding, the lessor sought to terminate the lease
agreement and to recover all prints of the motion picture. The lessee
opposed the claim, arguing that its sole asset was the distribution
rights, and that its chances to "achieve an adjustment of its unse-
cured debt" would be nullified if the repossession were permitted.
Although section 70b clearly applies to an arrangement pro-
ceeding, the court noted that the need to give strict adherence to
its provisions was not as compelling in an arrangement as in a
reorganization. A reorganization is a pervasive statutory method of
rehabilitating a financially distressed corporation through the rear-
rangement of all of its debts. Reorganization of a debtor without its
71. Smith v. Hoboken R.R. Warehouse & S.S. Connecting Co., 328 U.S. 123 (1946).
72. Pennsylvania Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Fountainbleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913 (5th
Cir. 1975); Queens Blvd. Wine v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Fleetwood Motel
Corp., 335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964).
73. Larkins v. Sills, 377 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Speare, 360 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1966);
B.J.M. Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri, 338 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964); Geraghty v. Kiamie Fifth Ave.
Corp., 210 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954).
74. Pennsylvania Real Estate Invest. Trust v. Fountainbleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913
(5th Cir. 1975).
75. No. 75-1186 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 1976).
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sole or principal asset is usually impossible. An arrangement pro-
ceeding, on the other hand, is a simpler statutory device to adjust
and settle unsecured debts.
The court held that in an arrangement proceeding the provi-
sions of section 70b should be used only as a "temporary aid to assist
the debtor to find an alternative solution to its problem."7 The
franchise agreement conferred no property right upon the lessee,
and the motion picture was therefore never an "asset" of the lessee.
The court emphasized that upon confirmation the lessee would lose
its distribution contract anyway since the lessor then would be free
to cancel it and recover the prints. As a result, there was no reason
to conclude that a refusal to enforce the forfeiture provision would
in any way assist in effectuating a successful plan of arrangement.
The court noted that the fact that its decision destroyed the lessee's
chances to effectuate an arrangement was "of no consequence.""
C. Settlors
In Brigadier Industries Corp. v. Gorman (In re Triangle In-
demnity Corp.),"8 a decision of first impression, the court concluded
that the tracing of trust funds through a commingled bank account
was not interrupted or defeated by another bank's wrongful dis-
honor of a deposit check which was to be included in the commin-
gled account. The bankrupt acted as a selling agent for the plaintiff
creditor who made mobile homes. The bankrupt sold a mobile
home to a third party who paid the purchase price to the bankrupt
for payment to the creditor. The purchase money was deposited by
the bankrupt in his own account at a local bank. The bankrupt later
withdrew slightly more than the purchase money from that account
and put it in another bank. It then deposited another large check
in the latter bank account. The deposit of this check should have
maintained the bankrupt's balance in the latter bank at far more
than the purchase money. However, the large deposit check was
dishonored, resulting in a balance less than the purchase price. The
dishonor was improper, however, and the large check was later ho-
nored, resulting in a balance greater than the purchase money.
The creditor claimed against the estate for the purchase money
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id. at 5.
78. 8 C.B.C. 167 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
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on the theory that the bankrupt held the money in trust for him.
Since a bankruptcy trustee does not succeed to the title to trust
assets of the bankrupt,79 the funds ordinarily would not be affected
by the bankruptcy. However, the funds had been commingled by
the bankrupt in its second bank account. The burden of tracing
commingled funds was upon the beneficiary. 0 With respect to any
trust funds that he was unable to identify and trace, he would have
to prove his claim as a general creditor against the debtor's estate.8
In tracing commingled funds, the general principle is that so
long as a commingled account is not depleted below the trust
amount, the account balance is presumed to include the trust
money. Withdrawals are presumed to have been only from funds
that properly could be used by the bankrupt.82 In this case, the court
applied a clearly correct, but unprecedented rule in holding that the
wrongful dishonor of a deposit check which temporarily resulted in
the "depletion" of the commingled account below the amount of the
trust funds had no effect upon the traceability of the funds in trust.
11. JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT
A. Consent to Jurisdiction by Counterclaim
Generally, a bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction is lim-
ited to the adjudication of rights and claims pertaining to property
in the actual or constructive possession of the bankruptcy court.8 3
When a controversy involves property in the actual or constructive
possession of a third person asserting a bona fide adverse claim, the
bankruptcy court may not assert summary jurisdiction without the
claimant's consent. Absent consent, suit must be brought in a court
of appropriate jurisdiction other than the bankruptcy court.84 Un-
79. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub noma. Schutzbank v.
Elliott, 385 U.S. 829 (1966); Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Callazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963);
American Serv. Co. v. Henderson, 120 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1941); Creel v. Birmingham Trust
Nat'l Bank, 383 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
80. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966).
81. Sonnenschein v. Reliance Ins. Co., 353 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1965); Gulf Petroleum, S.A.
v. Callazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963).
82. Voltz v. Peppas, 4 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1933).
83. Hebert v. Crawford, 288 U.S. 204 (1913). For a more complete discussion of summary
jurisdiction see Suskin & Swing, Ownership as a Basis for Summary Jurisdiction in Chapter
Xl Arrangements, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 307 (1977).
84. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191 (1926); Jan C. Uiterwyk Co. v. Brock (In re
Naviera Azta, S.A.), 500 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974).
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like the federal district courts, subject matter jurisdiction may be
conferred upon the bankruptcy court by the third party's consent
or waiver."
In Nathan v. Austin Travel Corp. (In re T.M.P., Inc.),88 another
case of first impression, a creditor who had not filed a proof of claim
was held to have consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court by counterclaiming against the trustee in an adversary pro-
ceeding instituted by the trustee. The trustees sued the creditor of
the bankrupt in the bankruptcy court to recover an account receiva-
ble. Although the creditor objected properly to the court's jurisdic-
tion, he also filed a counterclaim for affirmative relief against the
trustee. The court viewed the counterclaim as substantially a proof
of claim since it sought a money judgment from the estate. The
court held that by filing the counterclaim the creditor waived his
right to challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court
reasoned that a dismissal of the trustee's action would have allowed
the counterclaim to remain within the court's jurisdiction. That
result was viewed as "anomalous. 8 7
The court in Nathan first distinguished decisions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 13, which governs counterclaims in civil
actions. Under that rule, it has been held that objections to jurisdic-
tion over the person are waived by filing a counterclaim only when
the counterclaim is permissive. 8 However, counterclaims in bank-
ruptcy are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 713, which affirmatively
adopts Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13, with the important ex-
ception that all counterclaims are permissive.
Notwithstanding this distinction, the bankruptcy courts gener-
ally have employed a similar, although not identical principle.
Thus, while all counterclaims are permissive under Bankruptcy
Rule 713, it generally has been held that the bankruptcy court lacks
jurisdiction over a counterclaim filed by the trustee after the credi-
tor has filed a proof of claim, if the counterclaim does not arise out
of the same operative facts as the proof of claim.8 Similarly, the
85. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, 2302[2].
86. No. 76-95 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 1976).
87. Id. at 4.
88. Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 378 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1967); Hasse
v. American Photo. Corp., 299 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1962).
89. Associate Fundings, Inc. v. Phipps (In re Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch.),
464 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1972); Cherno v. Engine Air Serv., Inc., 330 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1964);
Peters v. Lines, 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960).
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Fifth Circuit has held that by filing a proof of claim, a claimant
(creditor) does not submit to summary jurisdiction allowing the
recovery of a preference from him, when the preference does not
arise out of the same transaction involved in the proof of claim. 0
This approach is obviously similar to the practice under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 13, since the test of the permissive or man-
datory nature of a counterclaim under that rule is whether the coun-
terclaim arises out of the same transaction as the complaint.
The reasoning in Nathan is somewhat unclear. It seems to sug-
gest that it is improper to exercise summary jurisdiction over a proof
of claim without exercising such jurisdiction over a trustee's claim
against the same creditor. Yet this practice was followed in B.F.
Avery & Sons Co. v. Davis,"' which was reaffirmed in United States
v. Tavormina (In re Airmotive Suppliers, Inc.)." Neither case was
mentioned in Nathan. The application of the Avery and Airmotive
principle also was intimated in Gill v. Phillips,93 where the claim
and counterclaim arose from the same transactions. The Nathan
case, while citing Gill, does not say whether the trustee's claim and
the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction. To the extent
that the decision implies that the court could exercise summary
jurisdiction over the trustee's claim, even if it did not arise from the
same transaction as the creditor's counterclaim, it appears to be in
conflict with the Avery, Gill,, and Airmotive decisions.
Nathan holds a message for the creditor who is sued improperly
in the bankruptcy court by the trustee. Unless it is preferable to
consent to the court's summary jurisdiction, only an objection to the
court's jurisdiction should be filed in response to the trustee's com-
plaint, even though the creditor has a valid claim against the estate.
A counterclaim could result in a finding that the creditor has con-
sented to jurisdiction over the trustee's claim, even if an objection
was filed. Where the estate may have a claim against the creditor
that could exceed greatly the probable dividends from the filing of
a proof of claim, it even may be advisable to file no proof of claim
if the trustee's potential claim arises out of the same transaction or
facts as the creditor's claim, or if it involves the same property.
90. B.F. Avery & Sons Co. v. Davis, 192 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
945 (1952).
91. Id.
92. 519 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. 337 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1964).
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A more logical decision was reached in In re Golf Resources,
Inc.," where a creditor brought an adversary proceeding to reclaim
vending machines which were sold to the debtor under an install-
ment sale contract. The debtor counterclaimed seeking damages for
a breach of warranty on the machines. The creditor sought dismissal
of the counterclaim on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the counterclaim. The court held that the
.creditor initially invoked the court's jurisdiction and had thereby
consented to its summary jurisdiction over all matters arising out
of the transaction upon which the creditor sued. The decision was
consistent with Avery and Gill in holding that summary jurisdiction
over a counterclaim was proper when the subject matter of the
counterclaim was the same as that of the original claim. The result
was correct since the counterclaim for the breach of warranty on the
vending machines involved the same property and the same trans-
action ."
B. Jurisdiction to Determine Dischargeability of Tax Liabilities
In Murphy v. IRS," the Fifth Circuit ruled for the first time
that a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to determine the dischar-
geability of a federal tax liability, even though the government had
not filed a proof of claim for the tax. In a subsidiary issue, also one
of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the court ruled that the
one hundred percent penalty tax imposed by section 6672 of the
Internal Revenue Code was not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Section 6672 imposes a "penalty" upon any person who fails in
his responsibility to collect withholding (payroll) taxes and to pay
them over to the government. The "penalty" is equal to the total
taxes not withheld or paid over. Murphy, a corporate officer who did
not pay withholding taxes to the government, was adjudicated
bankrupt and discharged. The United States filed no proof of claim
for the penalty tax, but the bankrupt asked the court to determine
its dischargeability as a debt. The government argued that the court
lacked jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of the penalty
tax because the government had filed no proof of claim for it. The
94. No. 75-462-T (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 1976).
95. See generally In re The All American Burger, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 763 (C.D. Cal.
1976); SEC v. Morgan Kennedy & Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,568 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
96. 533 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1976).
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bankruptcy court held that it had jurisdiction and that the penalty
tax was dischargeable. The district court upheld the bankruptcy
court's decision on jurisdiction but reversed on the ground that the
debt was not dischargeable. 7 The district court's decision was af-
firmed by the Fifth Circuit. 8
By holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the
tax issue, regardless of the filing of a proof of claim by the govern-
ment, the Fifth Circuit joined three other circuits which had pre-
viously so held. Their decisions drew upon the language of section
2a (2A) of the Act, which gives the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to
hear and determine "any question arising as to the amount or legal-
ity of any unpaid tax. . . which has not prior to bankruptcy been
contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative
tribunal."100 Such a literal reading of the statute conflicts with the
Report of the Senate Finance Committee involving the section.''
However, the general opinion has been that the Senate Committee
Report does not accurately reflect the legislative intent because the
bill originated in the House rather than the Senate. Moreover, the
Committee's recommendations were ultimately rejected, although
the bill passed.
With regard to the issue of dischargeability of corporate officer
liability under section 6672, the Fifth Circuit in Murphy adopted
the opinion of the district court which had relied upon the case of
Sherwood v. United States.02 Under the Bankruptcy Act so-called
97. 381 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
98. 533 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1976).
99. Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975); Gilliam v. United States,
519 F.2d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Century Vault Co., 416 F.2d 1035 (3d Cir. 1969).
Several district courts have held similarly. E.g., In re Savage, 329 F. Supp. 968 (C.D. Cal.
1971); United States v. Standard Milling Co., 324 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Tex. 1970); In re Curtis,
69-1 U.S.T.C. 9433 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (referee). Contra, In re Zook, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 9399
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
100. Bankrutpcy Act § 29(A2).
101. S. Rep. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 244Z, 245Z, observed that: "The committee understands that this amendment
makes no change in present law under which a bankruptcy court cannot adjudicate the merits
of any claim, including a Federal tax claim, which has not been asserted in the bankruptcy
proceeding by the filing of a proof of claim."
The Fifth Circuit has previously recognized this conflict. Gilbert v. United States (In re
Statmaster Corp.), 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972); accord, Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d
741, 742-43 (8th Cir. 1975); In re Durensky, 377 F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Tex. 1974), appeal
dismissed, 519 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amend-
ments of 1966, 1 GA. L. REv. 49, 159 n.41, 172-73 (1967).
102. 228 F. Supp. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
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"true penalties" owed the government are neither provable nor al-
lowable in bankruptcy, except for the amount of "pecuniary loss"
actually suffered by the government from the transaction which
gave rise to the penalty.' 3 Since "true penalties" are not provable
or allowable in bankruptcy, they also are not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. The Sherwood court pointed out that, if an actual pecuniary
loss to the government is included in a tax penalty, it is allowable
under section 57 of the Act. The loss also is provable by implication
under section 63 of the Act, and therefore is dischargeable. Since the
failure to withhold or pay over payroll taxes results in a pecuniary
loss to the government, the "penalty" imposed by section 6672 ordi-
narily is allowable, provable, and dischargeable. However, accord-
ing to the Murphy and Sherwood decisions, although section 6672
of the Internal Revenue Code imposes what it calls a "penalty," it
is really a shifted tax burden, since it only serves to force the irre-
sponsible corporate officer to pay the tax which the corporation
should have paid. Since the section 6672 "penalty" is a tax, not just
a "pecuniary loss penalty," it is nondischargeable because section
17 excludes from dischargeability a provable debt due as a tax to
the United States.
Before the Murphy decision was reported, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida reached a similar
result. In Eberly v. United States, °0 the district court reversed a
bankruptcy court's dismissal of an action involving the dischargea-
bility of a section 6672 liability. The bankrupt was an officer of a
corporation, and was in a position similar to the corporate officer in
Murphy. The bankrupt filed a voluntary petition listing taxes due
the United States, but the government did not file a proof of claim.
The bankrupt filed a claim on behalf of the government, assumedly
under section 57i of the Act,' 5 and sought a determination of the
dischargeability of the tax as a debt.
The bankruptcy judge dismissed the complaint on the ground
that it alleged no facts that would support a "genuine contention"
103. Section 57j of the Act provides in pertinent part that "[d]ebts owing to the United
States . . . as a penalty ... shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary
loss sustained by the act . . . out of which the penalty . . . arose."
104. 8 C.B.C. 633 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
105. Section 57i provides in pertinent part that "[wihenever a creditor whose claim
against a bankrupt estate is secured, in whole or part, by the individual undertaking of a
person, fails to prove and file that claim, that person may do so in the creditor's name."
Similar provisions are found in Bankruptcy Rules 11-33(d) and 304.
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that the debt was dischargeable. The court viewed the complaint as
an application for a declaratory judgment of a potential tax liabil-
ity, an action which is unavailable under the Federal Declaratory
Judgments Act. 08
In reversing, the district court held, as in Murphy, that section
2a(2A) of the Act grants the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to deter-
mine the amount or legality of any unpaid-tax, regardless of whether
the government has filed a proof of claim. 17 In addition, the court
held that the petition was not subject to dismissal simply because
it did not allege facts showing that the tax liability was discharge-
able. The court pointed out that the purpose of the dischargeability
provision of section 17c of the Act was simply to determine dis-
chargeability for or against the debtor. Therefore, it was unneces-
sary to allege facts showing that the tax liability was discharge-
able.'0
The court also dispensed with the argument by the government
that sovereign immunity and the Declaratory Judgment Act's pros-
cription of declaratory tax judgments barred the bankruptcy court
from granting the relief which the complaint sought. The court ruled
that since section 2a(2A) and section 17c of the Act give the court
jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of any tax claim, in-
dependent of the government's consent to jurisdiction, the position
taken by the government "has simply been overridden by Con-
gress." 09
C. Power to Invoke Jurisdiction
In In re Fidelity Development,"0 a bankruptcy court stated that
a Florida corporation undergoing dissolution proceedings can still
initiate chapter XI proceedings. The corporation was dissolved by
the Florida Secretary of State under the provisions of the old corpo-
ration law."' A creditor contended that because the corporation was
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) provides in part: "In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States . . . may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party. . . ." (Emphasis added).
107. Accord, Murphy v. IRS, 533 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1975); Bostwick v. United States,
521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975).
108. Indeed, section 17c(3) of the Act states that after a hearing the court is to determine
"the dischargeability of any debt for which an application for such determination has been
filed." (Emphasis added).
109. Eberly v. United States, 8 C.B.C. 633, 637 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
110. 8 C.B.C. 412 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
111. Law of June 15, 1953, ch. 28170, § 608.30, [1953] Fla. Laws 650 (repealed 1975).
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in dissolution, it no longer possessed the capacity or authority to file
a petition under chapter XI. The court held that the secured credi-
tor who attempted to challenge the ability of the debtor to seek
chapter XI relief lacked standing to challenge the capacity of the
debtor to seek relief. According to the court, standing was limited
to parties, such as stockholders, whose rights were affected directly
by the petition. However, assuming that standing was present, the
court stated that a corportion in dissolution under chapter 608 could
file a chapter XI petition.
The legal existence and the capacity of a corporation to func-
tion is governed in bankruptcy by the laws of the state that created
it. ' Under the old Florida corporation law every dissolved corpora-
tion was allowed to continue to operate as a body corporate for three
years after dissolution, but solely for the purposes of satisfying its
liabilities, selling and conveying its property, and dividing its re-
maining assets among the shareholders."' The corporate directors
were designated as a "Board of Trustees" for the corporate property.
They were granted the power and duty to collect debts, to collect
property belonging to the corporation, to pay debts and claims as
far as possible, and to prosecute and defend all suits arising after
dissolution, as well as suits then pending."' On the basis of these
provisions the court in Fidelity Development concluded that a dis-
solved Florida corporation could, through its trustees, sue, be sued,
collect debts, satisfy debts, and liquidate assets, all of which are
"the very essence of a bankruptcy proceeding instituted by volun-
tary bankrupt.""' 5 Although the corporation law under which
Fidelity Development was decided has been superseded by the new
Florida General Corporation Act, the dissolution provisions of the
new Act do not differ significantly from those of its predecessor, and
the same results should be reached under the new Act.116
112. See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120 (1937).
113. Law of June 15, 1953, ch. 28170, § 608.30(2)a, (3)a, [1953] Fla. Laws 650 (repealed
1975).
114. Id.
115. In re Fidelity Dev., 8 C.B.C. 412, 414 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
116. Florida Statutes section 607.301(1) (1975) also designates the directors of the corpo-
ration at the time of its dissolution as the board of trustees for corporate property. Florida
Statutes section 607.297 (1975) provides that the dissolution of a corporation shall not take
away or impair any remedy available to the corporation for any rights, claim, or liability




The court in Fidelity Development distinguished the decision
in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Building Corp.,"' in
which the United States Supreme Court held that under Illinois law
a corporation in dissolution for over two years could not initiate a
reorganization proceeding. In Chicago Title & Trust, the state cor-
poration law deprived the corporation of the capacity to initiate
legal proceedings. In addition, the decision involved a proposed re-
organization, in which the corporate existence of the debtor was of
prime significance. Several prior decisions,"8 including a Fifth Cir-
cuit decision," 9 have recognized the logic of this rationale. These
decisions, however, were not cited to the bankruptcy court in
Fidelity Development.
Section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act governs who may become a
bankrupt or a debtor in an arrangement or reorganization. Section
4a of the Act provides that any "person" is entitled to become a
voluntary bankrupt. Under section 1(23), a "person" includes cor-
porations, which in turn are defined in section 1(8) as "all bodies
having any of the powers and privileges of private corporations not
possessed by individuals or partnerships.' ' 0 Thus it appears that as
long as the body in dissolution possesses "any" power or privilege
of any private corporation not possessed by individuals or partner-
ships, it may file a voluntary petition. The limited liability of a
corporation therefore should suffice to maintain "corporation" sta-
tus. "' However, state law must still supply the power to initiate the
proceedings. Some decisions have indicated that state dissolution
laws cannot supersede the provisions of the Act. The result of such
cases has been that the corporation dissolved under state law may
still avail itself of the rehabilitative provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act. '2 Such decisions seem to be overruled by Chicago Title & Trust
Company.
It has also been suggested that after dissolution, and even after
the statutory life of the dissolved corporation has ended, a petition
under the Act might be filed in a case where the remaining share-
117. 302 U.S. 120 (1937).
118. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Ryan (In re Midwest Athletic Club), 161 F.2d 1005
(7th Cir. 1947); In re Vassar Foundry Co., 293 F. 248 (E.D. Mich. 1923).
119. McClung v. Hill, 96 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1938).
120. Bankruptcy Act § 1(8).
121. See generally, In re Carthage Lodge, 230 F. 694 (N.D.N.Y. 1916).
122. E.g., Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 59 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1932).
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holders act in unison under a trade name and constitute an unincor-
porated association. 123
IV. VALUATION OF SECURITY
In the case of In re Aldersgate Foundation, Inc. ,24 the court held
that the capitalization of earnings standard of valuation, which is
traditionally employed in entity valuation under chapter X, need
not be applied in all collateral valuation proceedings to the exclu-
sion of other methods of valuation. The debtor was a tax-exempt,
nonprofit organization, which had constructed and intended to op-
erate retirement communities in four Florida locations. Bonds were
issued to finance construction. Each bond was secured by a first
mortgage on the particular project for which it was issued.
The trustee initiated valuation proceedings under section 197
of the Act and under Bankruptcy Rule 10-302(b). Section 19712"
requires the court to divide the debtor's creditors and stockholders
into classes according to the nature of their claims or stock and to
determine summarily the value of the security for each. Rule 10-
302(b)'26 authorizes the court to hold a hearing to determine the
value of a security interest and to allow the claim as unsecured to
the extent that it exceeds its security.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, which is a necessary
party in reorganization proceedings, argued that the security for the
bonds could be valued only through a capitalization of earnings
approach, The court rejected the SEC's contention, employing in-
123. See e.g., In re Int'l Sugar Feed Co., 23 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1938); In re Booth's
Drug Store, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Va. 1937).
124. No. 74-383 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 1976).
125. Section 197 of the Act provides:
For the purposes of the plan and its acceptance, the judge shall fix the
division or creditors and stockholders into classes according to the nature of their
respective claims and stock. For the purposes of such classification, the judge
shall, if necessary, upon the application of the trustee, the debtor, any creditor,
or an indenture trustee, fix a hearing upon notice to the holders of secured claims,
the debtor, the trustee, and such other persons as the judge may designate, to
determine summarily the value of the security and classify as unsecured the
amount in excess of such value.
126. Bankruptcy Rule 10-302(b) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he court shall, if necessary, on application of any party in interest, hold a
hearing on such notice as the court may direct, to determine the value of the
security interest and allow the claim as unsecured to the extent it is enforceable
for any excess of the claim over such value.
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stead a mixture of such recognized valuation methods as cost-of-
replacement and comparable sales, in addition to the capitalization
of earnings method.
The capitalization of earnings method has long been the only
acceptable method in computing the "entity" value of a reorganiza-
tion debtor.'27 Such valuations as those conducted under section
221(2) of the Act, allow confirmation of a reorganization plan only
if the plan is "fair and equitable." Whether a plan is fair and equita-
ble depends principally upon the income potential of the corpora-
tion if it were reorganized. A determination must be made whether
the stockholders will be permitted to participate in the plan after
secured and unsecured creditors are secured by the plan. Creditors
and stockholders are classified separately under section 197. Stock-
holders rank below all creditors. Creditors are entitled to be secured
fully by the plan (which may be partly through the issuance of
stock) to the exclusion of any stockholder.1" Unless the "going con-
cern" value of the- corporate debtor is employed - usually resulting
in a higher value than other methods - stockholders may be ex-
cluded unfairly from the plan.'29 In such a case the fair and equitable
requirement of section 221(2) would not be satisfied.
It is clear that this standard is the only proper valuation
method under section 221(2).10 Whether it must be applied to a
valuation proceeding under section 197, the purpose of which is to
value specific collateral in order to determine the extent to which
each debtor. is secured, is not stated or understood clearly. As the
Aldersgate court noted, section 197 clearly contemplates the valua-
tion of a particular asset, not the entire debtor. It is used for the
purpose of determining what creditors are secured and to what ex-
tent they are secured, and not for the purpose of determining
whether the plan is "fair and equitable."
The Aldersgate court further rejected a strict capitalization of
earnings approach to property which either had no history of income
127. Protective Comm. for Independent Stockholders v. Anderson, (In re TMT Trailer
Ferry, Inc.), 390 U.S. 414 (1968); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510
(1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
128. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 89 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1937),
aff'd sub nor. Bache v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 97 F.2d 445 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 622 (1938).
129. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); North Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
130. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
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production, or which produced income only in conjunction with
property not covered by the security interest. Such a distinction has
been recognized in theory under section 221(2) where the corporate
debtor's assets are sufficiently nonproductive to render a capitaliza-
tion of earnings approach "futile," or where the liquidation value of
the debtor's assets exceed the debtor's going concern value.",' Only
two of the Aldersgate properties had any income-producing history.
The income-producing potential of the two other properties was
extremely questionable. As a result, the court employed several rec-
ognized asset valuation methods, including capitalization of earn-
ings. The court emphasized the capitalization of earnings method
in valuing the two income-producing properties.
The court rejected the SEC's reliance upon In re Equity Fund-
ing Corp. ,32 which held that the term "value of the security," as
used in section 197, refers to a value predicated upon a capitaliza-
tion of future earnings. The court in Equity Funding faced an argu-
ment similar to that presented in Aldersgate. Several creditors
argued that the section 197 value of their stock depended upon the
amount they could have realized by selling it, not a reorganization
value based upon capitalized earnings. The court disagreed on an
important basis. The security involved constituted all the outstand-
ing stock of the reorganization debtor. The court concluded that the
term "value of the security" in section 197 referred to a capitalized
earning value "when the collateral to be valued is the entire out-
standing stock [of the corporation]."' 33
The court in Aldersgate pointed out that because the "security"
involved in the Equity Funding decision was all the corporate stock,
the value of which could only be measured by the corporation's
earning potential, it was completely proper to do so. However, the
court concluded that to apply a similar rule to the valuation of
generally nonproductive tangible assets would be absurd.
V. PRIVILEGES
A. Newsman's Privilege
Also in In re Aldersgate Foundation Inc. ,' the court for the first
131. See 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, 11.05, at 604.
132. 391 F. Supp. 768 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
133. Id. at 773.
134. No. 74-383 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 1976).
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time considered the parameters of the so-called "newsman's privi-
lege," in a reorganization proceeding. The trustee sought to depose
a newsman who had quoted a party interested in the reorganization
as stating that the reorganization plan would not be accepted. The
source was identified in the newspaper report. The trustee con-
tended that this statement was in violation of the no-solicitation
rule. 5 The source denied making the statement. The trustee sought
to determine whether the report was accurate. Criminal sanctions
for the claimed violation were not involved.
The court granted the reporter's motion for a protective order
on the narrow ground that under the circumstances a violation of
the no-solicitation rule was inconsequential. The court had not ap-
proved a plan to be submitted to the creditors. However, the court
went on to make a number of observations covering the so-called
"newsman's privilege" in bankruptcy proceedings. The court ob-
served that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Branzburg v. Hayes3 ' which denied such a privilege, did not control
in a civil matter. Branzburg involved the privilege claim of a news-
man who refused to tell a grand jury the names of persons who used
illegal drugs in his presence and whose criminal actions were re-
ported in his newspaper. The Supreme Court held that the reporter
was not entitled to withhold from the grand jury the names of per-
sons whom he had seen commit crimes. The Court founded the
decision upon the constitutionally mandated existence and role of
the grand jury in protecting the public from crimes. The Court
acknowledged that the news gathering process "qualifies" for first
135. Section 176 of the Act provides:
No person shall, without the consent of the court, solicit any acceptance, condi-
tional or unconditional, of any plan, or any authority, conditional or uncondi-
tional, to accept any plan, whether by proxy, deposit, power of attorney or other-
wise, until after the entry of an order approving such plan and the transmittal
thereof to the creditors and stockholders, as provided in Section 175 of this Act;
and any such authority or acceptance given, procured, or received by reason of a
solicitation prior to such approval and transmittal shall be invalid, unless such
consent of the court has been so obtained.
Bankruptcy Rule 10-304 provides:
No person shall, without the consent of the court, solicit any acceptance or rejec-
tion, conditional or unconditional, of any plan, whether by proxy, deposit, power
of attorney or otherwise, until after the entry of an order approving such plan
pursuant to Rule 10-303(c) and the transmittal thereof to creditors and stockhold-
ers pursuant to Rule 10-303(e). Rule 10-211(b) applies to any violation of this rule.
136. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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amendment protection, but that the interest of the state in grand
jury proceedings outweighed the first amendment rights of news-
men. Branzburg was the last significant statement by the Supreme
Court on the topic.
Although Branzburg does not control in civil matters, it does
not follow necessarily that a newsman always possesses the privilege
to withhold information from civil courts. The "newsman's privi-
lege" has been a qualified privilege which has been measured differ-
ently in civil cases than in criminal cases. The news gathering pro-
cess has been held sufficiently important to prevail over the need
of a party to civil litigation to force a breach of a confidence., 7
Generally, the privilege has been respected in civil pretrial discov-
ery. Discovery is usually denied when it is impossible for the party
seeking discovery to demonstrate that his need for the information
is compelling, is crucial to his case, and is not practically accessible
elsewhere. 3 ' It has been held, however, that the privilege exists only
when the requested information "directly leads to the disclosure of
confidence."' 39 Allegations that production of the requested infor-
mation could result in the discovery of a confidential news source
have been insufficient.
The court in Aldersgate recognized correctly that there was
little reason to recognize the privilege where the purpose of discov-
ery was to verify the accuracy of information already published by
an identified source. To do otherwise would go further than seems
reasonable in preventing a chilling effect upon the exercise of first
amendment freedoms by the press. Indeed, some state "shield
laws," enacted to confer a "qualified" newsman's privilege, protect
only the source's identity, not his information."' Others do not con-
fer a true "privilege," but immunize from contempt sanctions news-
men refusing to divulge sources of published information and all
unpublished information."' Still others simply protect from con-
temp refusals to disclose sources of information."' Florida has no
137. Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976); Loadholtz v.
Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
138. Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976); Loadholtz v.
Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
139. Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. at 511.
140. For a discussion of these laws see Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 37 Ohio
Misc. 30, 302 N.E.2d 593 (Ohio C.P. 1973).
141. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Ct. App. 1975).
142. Apicella v. McNeil Labs, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (New York statute).
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shield law. If it did, however, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 could
make it applicable to civil adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy
courts.'43
Although Aldersgate was itself founded upon a narrow ground,
it evidences an adoption by the bankruptcy court of the rationale
which upholds the newsman's right to withhold confidential sources
of information and preparatory notes in civil litigation, except when
the party seeking the information can demonstrate a compelling
need for the information.'" The definition of a compelling need in a
bankruptcy contest must await future decisions.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
In Gorman v. Martinez (In re Amjoe, Inc.),'45 a case of first
impression in the nation, the court held that a bankruptcy trustee
could waive the bankrupt's attorney-client privilege in an adversary
proceeding. In administering the estate, the trustee objected to the
proofs of claim filed by a creditor. The trustee also filed a counter-
claim against Martinez for damages. In the course of the proceed-
ings, the trustee scheduled the deposition of the bankrupt's former
attorney. Both the attorney and the defendant raised the attorney-
client privilege. An officer of the bankrupt corporation signed an
affidavit invoking the privilege. The court ruled that the trustee,
under the circumstances, could waive the attorney-client privilege
on behalf of the bankrupt, and that the bankrupt could not override
the trustee's waiver.
The court observed that an adjudication of bankruptcy has no
legal effect upon the existence of the bankrupt corporation. It con-
tinues to transact business while its affairs are being conducted in
the bankruptcy court. The defendant argued that the corporate
143. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that state rules of "privilege" are to be
applied in proving or disproving "an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision." When statutes create not a privilege, but only immunity from
contempt, the application of Rule 501 is uncertain. See Appicella v. McNeil Labs, Inc., 66
F.R.D. 78, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
144. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
145. No. 75-265-T (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 1976). The law firm of the authors of this article
represents a party in this case. The decision of the bankruptcy judge is on appeal. Although
the decision of the bankruptcy judge appears to the authors to be sufficiently significant to
merit its inclusion in this article, the authors offer no analysis or comment upon the correct-
ness of the decision. Only the decision of the bankruptcy judge and the rationale employed
by him in reaching his decision, as expressed in his written opinion, are reported.
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bankrupt therefore retained its power to invoke the attorney-client
privilege. The court noted that section 70a(3) of the Act gives the
trustee those " 'powers which the bankrupt might have exercised
for his own benefit.' ""'6 The court stated that the power referred
to in section 70a(3) does not include powers that are strictly per-
sonal to the bankrupt and do not relate directly to property of the
estate."7 However, it concluded that the attorney-client privilege
"lack[ed] the characteristic of a personal privilege in the true
sense.""' 8 Thus, the trustee could waive it.
The court in Gorman relied upon Weck v. District Court.'45 In
that decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a trustee for a
bankrupt corporation succeeded to the powers of the corporate
board of directors, who, under the applicable Colorado privilege
statute, were given expressly the power to waive the corporation's
accountant-client privilege. Weck was founded centrally upon the
view that the bankruptcy trustee takes the place and exercises the
office of the corporate directors.'5  The rationale employed in
Gorman emphasized that the purpose of the trustee's questions was
to assert a right on behalf of the estate and that a contrary holding




Two of the more fertile sources of litigation under the Act are
whether a debt is nondischargeable because it was obtained through
fraud and whether a general discharge of the bankrupt or debtor
should be allowed when the bankrupt has violated the law, engaged
in fraud, or destroyed essential books and documents. The first
question arises under section 17a of the Act. The second question
arises under section 14 of the Act.
146. Id. at 5, quoting § 70a(3) of the Act.
147. Id., citing 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, 7.13(2), at 124.
148. No. 75-265-T, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 1976).
149. 161 Colo. 384, 422 P.2d 46 (1967). The Gorman court also cited In re Fuller, 262 U.S.
91 (1923) which the bankruptcy court characterized as holding that: "A recognition of the
[fifth amendment] privilege would have obstructed and frustrated the bankruptcy trustee
to acquire 'properties' of the estate." No. 75-265-T, slip op. at 6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 1976).
150. 161 Colo. at 388, 422 P.2d at 48.
151. No. 75-265-T, slip op. at 6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 1976).
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Generally, section 17 exempts from discharge any provable
debt of the bankrupt which was created or obtained by fraud. The
statutory provisions encompass obtaining money or property by
false pretenses, and obtaining extensions of credit through materi-
ally false, written financial statements.'52 Since a discharge of the
debt can be avoided under such circumstances, section 17 is invoked
frequently by the creditor since he has nothing to lose and every-
thing to gain by doing so.
Three critical stumbling blocks exist for the creditor seeking to
avoid the discharge of an indebtedness under section 17: failures to
show reliance, materiality, and intent to deceive. Even a materially
false financial statement is insufficient. There must be an intention
to deceive or such a reckless disregard for the truth as to be tanta-
mount to willful misrepresentation. 53 Imputed or implied fraud will
not do; the party alleging fraud must prove actual or positive
fraud.5 4 The creditor must show by clear and convincing evidence
that: (1) the debtor made a false representation; (2) he knew it was
false at the time; (3) he made it with the intention and purpose of
deceiving the creditor; (4) the creditor relied on the representation;
and (5) the creditor sustained loss and damages as a proximate
result of the misrepresentation. 55
The bulk of the litigation under section 17 involves alleged
fraud in connection with obtaining money or property on credit. In
a number of recent decisions, some courts have abandoned the re-
quirement of an affirmative misrepresentation as a precondition to
152. Bankruptcy Act § 17a. This section provides in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his prova-
ble debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as . . . are liabilities
for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations, or
obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining an extension or renewal of
credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respecting his
financial condition made or published. . . in any manner whatsoever with intent
to deceive, or for willful and malicious conversion of the property of another ....
153. In re Starr Parker, No. 75-870 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 1976); United States v. Syros,
254 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
154. As the court pointed out in Avco Fin. Servs. v. Jackson, No. 75-592 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
8, 1976), what must be shown is "proof of cunning, deceit, or artifice employed to circumvent,
to cheat, or to deceive another." Public Fin. Corp. v. Taylor, 51,4 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975);
CIT Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Gabriel, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 128 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 1976); In re
Dolnick, 374 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
155. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Johnston, No. 75-970 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1976); Public Fin.
Corp. v. Taylor, 514 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975); Friendly Fin. Serv. Co. v. Windham, 240 So.2d
26 (La. App. 1970).
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establishing nondischargeability under section 17a(2).
In Montgomery Ward Co. v. Beaser,56 the district court antici-
pated the Fifth Circuit's rejection of its rule which requires an overt
false pretense or misrepresentation in order to render a debt nondis-
chargeable under section 17a(2) of the Act. That section exempts
from a discharge in bankruptcy liabilities "for obtaining money or
property by false pretenses or false representations."'57 In Beaser, a
creditor attempted to block the discharge of a debt arising out of a
bankrupt's revolving charge account. Beaser had submitted a credit
application which overstated his income. He made numerous pur-
chases under the charge plan at times when he could not have
believed reasonably that he could pay for them. The question was
whether the debts thus created were within the rule established by
the Fifth Circuit in Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell. "' The Caldwell
decision did not appear to include within section 17a(2) subsequent
purchases which were made without any overt misrepresentation:
"The only kind of fraud which will prevent a discharge is that com-
mitted by fraudulent misreprsentations of fact or by such conduct
or artifice having a fraudulent purpose as will throw one off his
guard and will cause him to omit inquiry or examination which he
would otherwise make.' ' 0
Caldwell's restrictive language was characterized by the Beaser
court as "not bear[ing] close scrutiny."'10 Rejecting the Caldwell
rule, the court followed the line of authority, exemplified by In re
Black,"' which held that every credit purchase contains an implied
promise to pay for the merchandise. Under this view, a credit pur-
chase made with actual knowledge that sufficient funds to pay for
the purchase will never exist results in "symbolic misrepresen-
tations,""' satisfying section 17a(2).
Section 17a(2) contains no express requirement of an overt false
pretense or misrepresentation. It appears that the Caldwell rule was
created more by judicial fiat than by statutory compulsion. Indeed,
a strong dissent in Caldwell advanced the rule adopted in Beaser.6 3
156. No. 75-716 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 1976).
.157. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2).
158. 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941).
159. Id. at 191-92.
160. No. 75-716, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 1976).
161. 373 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
162. Id. at 107.
163. 115 F.2d at 192 (Sibley, J., dissenting).
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Beaser was the first open rejection of Caldwell in the Fifth Circuit.
Although not known to the district court at the time, the Fifth
Circuit's apparent dissatisfaction with Caldwell had been evidenced
in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Boydston,'" where it was acknowledged
openly in dicta that Caldwell "has been severely eroded in the mod-
ern world of credit transactions and the decision has been the sub-
ject of much criticism.""'
It appears that the Fifth Circuit will reject Caldwell. Credit
purchases made with knowledge that they cannot be paid for should
be considered nondischargeable. The present erosion and probable
future abandonment of Caldwell may have substantial import in
personal bankruptcies since many credit card transactions are often
a major part of the debts owed.
In Bank of Clearwater v. Sullivan,6 ' the court faced a con-
tested dischargeability issue involving a Master Charge card. The
debtor, who had a Master Charge card with a $500 credit limit,
stated on his card application that he had an income of $700
monthly. He had virtually no income. During a two-week period, he
made nearly $3,000 worth of credit purchases with his card.
Even though the debtor obviously lied on his credit application,
the court rejected the bank's reliance upon the second sentence of
section 17a(2) which bars the discharge of liabilities founded upon
money or property obtained on credit by virtue of a materially false,
written statement. The court did so because the credit card applica-
tion did not call for a disclosure of all the assets and liabilities of
the applicant. As a result, it was not a "financial statement" ac-
cording to the court.
However, the court upheld the bank's claim for a bar to dis-
charge under the first sentence of section 17a(2), for obtaining
money or property under false pretenses. In accordance with the
Fifth Circuit's remarks in Boydston, the court held that in making
credit card purchases beyond his ability to pay, the debtor had
represented symbolically that he had the means and intention to
pay for them.
Initially it appears that the court's approach virtually elimi-
nates from the Act the fraud-in-connection-with-credit provision of
164. 520 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975).
165. Id. at 1101.
166. No. 75-632 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 1976).
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section 17a(2). It allows the creditor to bar a discharge under the
general obtaining-money-by-false pretenses standard, while the cir-
cumstances of the debt more specifically involve a credit transac-
tion. This situation seems to be covered more appropriately by the
fraud-in-connection-with-credit provision which, according to the
court, was not satisfied. However, no injury is done to the statutory
scheme or the legislative intent by such a reading. The fraud-in-
connection-with-credit provision of section 17a(2) was added by the
1962 amendments to the Act. Previously, the courts had begun to
hold that obtaining money or property on credit through false pre-
tenses was within the existing language of section 17a(2). 67 The
section 17 amendment was inserted apparently in connection with
the amendment of section 14c(3), in order to protect the particular
creditor who was defrauded by financial statements through which
credit wag obtained, while limiting the right of other creditors to
prevent a discharge entirely.
It has become the practice of many small loan companies to
include "boilerplate" statements in their credit applications to en-
hance their ability to bar a discharge under section 17. This prac-
tice is due to the strict construction courts have placed on section
17a(2) by requiring that a "financial statement" request the dis-
closure of all liabilities,' that the creditor prove an actual intent
to defraud rising almost to criminal intent,' 9 and that the creditor
clearly prove reliance. 7 ° However, the use of these statements has
met with varying results.
In General Finance Corp. v. Studstill,'7 ' the debtor completed
a loan application bearing a printed legend stating that by extend-
ing credit, the lender was relying upon the financial statement, that
a false statement could result in the loss of the dischargeability of
a debt in bankruptcy, and that no one had suggested that the debtor
could omit any of the debts.'72 In completing the credit application,
167. See, e.g., In re Freudman, 130 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 222 F.2d 369
(2d Cir. 1955); 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, 17.16[3], at 1641-42.
168. Dial Fin. Co. v. Duthu, 188 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 1966).
169. Public Fin. Corp. v. Taylor, 514 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975); Liberty Loan Corp. v.
Broome, No. 75-545 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 1976).
170. Public Fin. Corp. v. Taylor, 514 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975); CIT Fin'l Servs., Inc. v.
Gabriel, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
171. No. 75-220 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 1976).
172. The printed legend read in full:
Notwithstanding any previous dealing I may have had with General Finance, I
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the debtors stated that they had no outstanding obligations to retail
stores, although they did. Without discussion, the court held that
the debt was nondischargeable. Taking into consideration the num-
ber of creditors and the amount of debts omitted from the state-
ment, the court found that it was reasonable to infer that the state-
ment was submitted to induce the plaintiff to grant the loan with
specific intent to deceive the lender. The court further concluded
that the lender relied on those statements.
In Beneficial Finance Co. v. Johnston,' however, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida upheld the
dischargeability of a debt made in connection with a credit state-
ment which contained a statement similar to that involved in
Studstill.74 Although the credit statement contained an acknowl-
edgement by the debtor that he had not been instructed to omit any
of his debts, the evidence revealed that he actually had been so
instructed by an agent of the lender.
The court's general attitude toward such attempts to bar dis-
charge under section 17a(2) was reflected most clearly in CIT Finan-
cial Services, Inc. v. Gabriel.' In CIT the court denied a small loan
company's attempt to bar discharge under a highly detailed docu-
ment containing typical "boilerplate" language. The court observed
that absent clear and undisputed evidence of all the elements of
fraud, the debtor usually wins, frequently by a failure to find deceit-
ful intent. In upholding the dischargeability of the debt in CIT, the
understand that in extending credit to me, it is relying on my Financial Condition
as shown in this Statement made by me. I understand that giving a false state-
ment of my financial condition may result in civil liabilities and a possible loss
of right to have a debt discharged in Bankruptcy. I have read the instructions
before I completed this Statement. NO ONE HAS SUGGESTED THAT I MAY
OMIT ANY OF MY DEBTS.
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
173. No. 75-970 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1976).
174. The Beneficial Finance Statement provided the following warning: "Notice: If you
knowingly give a false statement regarding your credit, and the lender relies on it in part in
making the loan, your obligation would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy. For your benefit
this credit statement should be true and complete." The following appeared on the credit
statement just above the signature of the defendant:
I have no debts and liabilities in excess of $25.00 other than 'those listed hereon. I
certify that I have not been instructed by the Lender to which I have made an
application for a loan to list only certain debts. Instead my instructions have been
to list all outstanding debts and liabilities.
Id. at 2.
175. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
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court emphasized the disparity in financial sophistication between
the typical small loan company and its client. Most importantly,
the court pointed out that under such unequal circumstances, loan
managers "have the positive obligation to prove that the bankrupts
were thoroughly informed on the 'facts of life'. . . prior to the filling
out of the so-called financial statement if they are to prove an intent
to deceive on the part of a borrowing bankrupt."'' 6
In any event, the bankrupt or debtor must obtain "money or
property" before section 17 can apply. Normally, a finding that
money or property was obtained is obvious. In Williams v. Harris,'77
such was not the case. The question was one of first impression:
Whether the obtaining of a loan guaranty constitutes the obtaining
of "money or property" within the meaning of section 17a(2). The
bankrupt induced the objecting creditor to "co-sign" with him a
note which was given to obtain a loan. The loan proceeds were used
by the bankrupt's corporation. The cosignee subsequently had to
pay the note when the bankrupt defaulted. Although the cosigna-
ture was obtained through false statements, the loan was not. The
bankrupt argued that the cosignature was not "money or property"
within the meaning of section of 17a(2), so that his debt to the
cosignee could be discharged.
The court avoided the question of whether a cosignature is
"money or property," by holding that the "money or property"
requirement of section 17a(2) was satisfied by the loan made to the
bankrupt. Faced with scant and conflicting authority,' the court
held essentially that section 17a(2) does not require that the fraud
or false pretenses be practiced upon the initial lender, but only that
the "money or property" be obtained in connection with false pre-
tenses upon someone without whom the loan would not have been
made. In that sense, money from the lender was obtained clearly as
a result of the false pretenses practiced upon a guarantor without
whom the loan would not have been made. In addition, the court
pointed out that the Act does not require that the "money or prop-
erty" pass directly to the bankrupt, as long as the creditor parts
with the money "on behalf of" the bankrupt.'
176. Id. at 132.
177. No. 75-1245-T (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 1976).
178. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1915); Barnes v. Frost, 160 Miss. 131, 133 So. 11
(1931); Garr v. Martin, 20 N.Y. 306 (1859).




In Maiman v. Maiman,80 the court held dischargeable a debt
owed to a divorced wife by her prior husband under a hold harmless
clause contained in a stipulation in a final judgment of dissolution
of marriage. Section 17a(7) of the Act exempts from discharge debts
'for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of
a wife or child.
In the dissolution judgment, obtained in New York, the hus-
band and wife entered into a stipulation in which the wife waived
any request for alimony, ostensibly because she was employed and
doing well. It was stipulated also that the husband would hold the
wife harmless for debts incurred during coverture. When the hus-
band filed the bankruptcy petition, the wife sought to have the debt
owed to her under the hold harmless provision deemed nondischar-
geable. It was the wife's position that the hold harmless clause was
intended as a substitute for an award of alimony or maintenance
and was therefore nondischargeable.
The court rejected the wife's argument on the simple ground
that the stipulation in the dissolution proceeding nowhere evi-
denced either an intention to treat the hold harmless provision as a
substitute for alimony, or that the wife's waiver of alimony was
conditioned specifically upon performance of the hold harmless pro-
vision. In addition, there was no proof in the record before the New
York court that the wife would have been entitled to alimony.
The Maiman decision is not strongly supported by prior author-
ity. The decision's only citation of authority for the principle that
the hold harmless debt would not be alimony under Florida law,
Belcher v. Belcher,'8 ' does not clearly support the principle. In
Belcher, the wife executed an antenuptial agreement waiving her
right to alimony in the event of divorce. In return, she obtained from
her husband assets worth more than $200,000. None of the several
decisions arising out of the Belcher dissolution made any mention
of a hold harmless provision in favor of the wife." 2
Misc. Rep. 628, 159 N.Y.S. 703 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
180. 9 C.B.C. 118 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
181. 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
182. See Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1972); Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1975); Belcher v. Belcher, 290 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Belcher v.
Belcher, 256 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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Other jurisdictions have differed on this point. In Waller v.
Waller"3 the dischargeability of a hold harmless provision which
was executed as part of a separation agreement in Ohio was at
issue. '4 The parties were later divorced. The husband filed in bank-
ruptcy, and scheduled a debt owed to a furniture company. He did
not list his ex-wife as a creditor. She filed no claim, and she did not
know of the bankruptcy. After discharge of the bankrupt, the furni-
ture company sued the ex-wife to recover the balance of the debt.
The bankruptcy proceeding was reopened. The bankrupt contended
that the hold harmless agreement was dischargeable because it con-
stituted a property division, rather than alimony or support. Rely-
ing upon Ohio law,' the court held that hold harmless or indemnity
provisions can constitute alimony. In so holding, the court empha-
sized the lack of any Ohio decision to the contrary, and that the
purpose of the separation agreement and the indemnification provi-
sions was to assure the wife of having furniture that would not be
taken away by creditors of the husband.
A number of courts have faced the problem of characterizing,
for bankruptcy purposes, provisions for the payment of money made
in written agreements or by order of courts as either alimony or
property settlement agreements. 8 ' Perhaps the best summary of the
essential test is found in In re Alcorn,"7 where the court observed
that:
[Tihe Court must look to the nature of the contract itself and
ascertain whether the agreement is one which merely provides for
the division of property between the parties, and as such is in lieu
of alimony and a bona fide property settlement agreement, or
whether the contract, although denominated 'property settle-
ment agreement,' is one which embodies within its terms the
183. 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974).
184. The separation agreement provided in pertinent part, under the heading "Prior
Debts" that "[tihe husband shall pay and indemnify and hold the wife absolutely harmless
from all existing obligations." Id. at 448.
185. Collins v. Smith, 26 Ohio Misc. 231, 270 N.E.2d 377 .(Ohio C.P. 1971); Fredericks
v. Fredericks, 76 Ohio Law Abst. 296, 146 N.E.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1956).
186. See, e.g., In re Gorski, 25 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.N.Y. 1938) (nondischargeable); Rob-
erts v. Roberts, 261 Cal.2d 424, 68 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Ct. App. 1968) (nondischargeable); Kadel
v. Kadel, 250 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio C.P. 1969) (nondischargeable); Treece v. Treece, 458 P.2d
633 (Okla. 1969) (nondischargeable); Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (1949) (dis-
chargeable).
187. 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
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common law or statutory duty [of a husband to care for and
support his wife] and, consequently, is essentially a contract for
maintenance and support.18
Payments in the nature of support of the wife and child are also
nondischargeable under section 17.111 The Maiman decision may be
'subject to criticism because it did not engage clearly in any such
analysis. It should, however, serve as a caution to drafters of hold
harmless agreements in dissolution proceedings, particularly when
bankruptcy of the covenantor is foreseeable. If the agreement is in
the nature of alimony or support, it should at least so state.
B. Debtors'
Under section 14c of the Act, a full discharge may be denied if
the bankrupt has destroyed, falsified, or failed to preserve adequate
records of his financial condition, or if he fails to explain losses of
assets. 190 In Appelberg v. Harrison,9' the court denied the bankrupt
a discharge when the bankrupt was unable to explain the disappear-
ance of $30,000 during the month preceding the filing of his petition
in bankruptcy. The bankrupt's explanation was that most of the
money was spent on clothes and food, but he could produce no proof
of purchase. Invoking the rule that only honest debtors are to receive
a discharge, the court held that sections 14c(2) and (7) of the Act
were violated, even though the expenses were not of the type for
which a duty to keep records is normally recognized. The court held
that even though the bankrupt's activities were supposedly social,
they were sufficiently extensive to require that some records be kept
to prove them in bankruptcy.
188. Id. at 209. For an excellent, recent discussion of these principles, see Abrams v.
Burg, 327 N.E.2d 745 (Mass. 1975).
189. In re Hollister, 47 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
190. Section 14c of the Act provides in pertinent part:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has
(2) destroyed, mutilated, falsified, concealed, or failed to keep or preserve
books of account . . . from which his financial condition . . . might be ascer-
tained . . . or (7) has failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or defi-
ciency of assets to meet his liabilities . . . [If] upon the hearing of an objection
to a discharge, the objector shall show to the satisfaction of the court that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt has committed any of
[these acts,] . . . then the burden of proving that he has not committed any of
such acts shall be upon the bankrupt.
191. No. 75-567 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 1976).
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The duty to keep records under section 14c(2) always has been
applied practically to the particular circumstances of each case.
Generally, the rule has been that unless the bankrupt's situation
"was such that the normal person under like circumstances would
not have kept books and records," he is not required to do so.'"' The
courts have emphasized that section 14c provides expressly that a
failure to keep books or records which is "justified under all the
circumstances of the case"' 3 is sufficient to avoid a denial of, dis-
charge. Thus, it has been held in several instances of nonbusiness
expenses that no duty to keep books arises. However, these decisions
typically have involved salaried employees or situations where it
would otherwise be ludicrous to expect records to be kept.'94
The Fifth Circuit has required a hearing upon whether the
bankrupt's business "was of sufficient complexity to require the
keeping of books and records."' 5 Both the Fifth Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit have held that large sums of money squandered or
gambled away without adequate records can result in a denial of
discharge, regardless of the condition of the business books.'96 It
should also be noted that Bankruptcy Rule 407 has superseded and
changed the burden of proof allocated by section 14c in disputed
discharge proceedings. The rule provides that "the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the facts essential to his objection."'97 This is
contrary to section 14c, which provides that once the objector has
shown reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt has com-
mitted a prohibited act, "the burden of proving that he has not
committed any such acts shall be upon the bankrupt."'' 9
The court in Appelberg also considered the objector's claim
that section 14c(7) prevented discharge, on the ground that the
192. In re Weismann, 1 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
193. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(2).
194. See, e.g., Morris Plan Indus. Bank v. Dreaher, 144 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1944) (itinerant
rags and clothes peddler); In re Worlay, 47 F. Supp. 212 (D. Neb. 1942); In re Rios, 27 F.
Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
195. Bartolotta v. Lutz, 485 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 1973).
196. McBee v. Sliman, 512 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975); Crider v. Jordan, 255 F.2d 378 (4th
Cir. 1958).
197. Bankruptcy Rule 407. In In re Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D. Fla. 1975) the
court stated: "Rule 407 removed the 'burden shifting' provision of § 14(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act. . . . and placed it at all times upon the objecting creditor."
198. Bankruptcy Act § 14c. See Feldenstein v. Radio Distrib. Co., 323 F.2d 892 (6th Cir.




bankrupt had failed to explain satisfactorily his loss of assets. The
court held such explanations as "I paid debts" to be insufficient.'99
VII. PREFERENCES
In Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. Turner Enterprises, Inc. ,200 the
'court rejected a novel preference theory. The problem arose because
the Internal Revenue Service filed a large claim which thwarted an
arrangement proceeding. Being unable to pay the tax claim, the
debtor sought to reduce or eliminate it. The debtor asked the court
to set aside a net operating loss deduction that it had "transferred"
to its subsidiary by filing a consolidated federal income tax return.
According to the debtor, a net operating loss was "property" which
was "transferred" without consideration, thus rendering it fraudu-
lent as to existing creditors under the Bankruptcy Act. 0'
The court first suggested that a net operating loss available
under the tax law could constitute "property" under the Act. The
court observed in particular that section 70a of the Act provides a
comprehensive general test for determining whether the property in
question is part of the estate. According to the test, the trustee holds
title to all "property," including rights of action, which the bank-
rupt could have transferred and which might have been levied upon
and sold. Tax refund claims have been held to be property under
the Act.02 Whether something is "property" under the Act is deter-
mined in view of the twofold purpose of the Act: (1) to convert the
estate into cash for distribution among the creditors; and (2) to give
the bankrupt a "fresh start. ' °3 It has been said that: ,
199. Appelburg v. Harrison, No. 75-567 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 1976), citing Minella v.
Phillips, 245 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1957). Section 14c(7) has not been "fully explored." The best
that has been said is probably that a "satisfactory explanation" or a loss of assets "probably
means that the bankrupt must explain his losses or deficiencies in such manner as to convince
the court of good faith and business-like conduct," not that he adequately explained his
losses, regardless of how they came about. 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy, supra note 28, 14.60,
at 1436.
200. No. 73-179 (M.D. Fla. May 10, 1976).
201. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2). This section provides:
Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within one
year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this Act by or
against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time such transfer or
obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is or
will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual intent.
202. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974), aff'g In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1973); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
203. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 646 (1974), citing Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S.
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The main thrust of Section 70a(5) is to secure for creditors every-
thing of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable
form when he files his petition. To this end the term "property"
has been construed most generally and an interest is not outside
its reach because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment
must be postponed.2"4
Net operating loss deductions are not leviable. In addition, they
are not freely assignable among the general public, being available
for "transfer" only in very limited situations among related corpo-
rate entities. As a result, they do not satisfy easily the test for
"property." The fact that tax refunds have been held to be
"property" under the Act is unpersuasive, since refunds represent
a claim for cash against the treasury. Koscot did not make clear
whether a "setting aside" of the transfer of the net operating loss
would result in an actual refund due the debtor, or would result only
in a reduction in taxes due.'"5 The mere right to a tax reduction not
resulting in a refund does not ever before appear to have been recog-
nized as "property" under the Act. Nevertheless, it seems logical
that since even a reduction in the debtor's tax liability would inure
to the direct benefit of the estate and the creditors, it falls within
the spirit of section 70 and the Act." 6
The court in Koscot found plausible all other premises for set-
ting aside the "transfer" of the net operating loss deduction. How-
ever, the court held that it was without power to grant the relief
requested by the debtor since such relief would be the granting of
375 (1966); Short v. Grand, 507 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1974), citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 417
U.S. 642 (1974).
204. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 646 (1974), quoting Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S.
375, 379 (1966).
205. The court's only observation as to the possible effect of allowing the deconsolidation
sought by the debtor was that: "The election to file the consolidated return deprived Koscot
of something which otherwise would have been available to it and could have conceivably
either have reduced or extinguished its tax liability." No. 73-179, slip op. at 7 (M.D. Fla. May
10, 1976).
206. The court observed that the "transfer" did not offend the Assignment of Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970), even though strict compliance with the Assignment Act was not
rendered. The Assignment Act, literally read, renders null the transfer or assignment of "any
claim upon the United States," unless certain formalities are complied with and occur after
allowances of the claim by the government. However, the law has been construed to allow
enforcement of an otherwise invalid transfer between the assignee and assignor when no
danger exists that the government will be exposed to multiple claims thereon. See Segal v.
Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1966); Martin v. National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588, 594-95
(1937); In re Lagerstrom, 300 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Ill. 1969).
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leave to file an amended or "deconsolidated" tax return for the
relevant tax years. Since the method of filing tax returns is governed
by the Internal Revenue Code, not the Bankruptcy Act, the relief
sought could be granted only if it were consistent with the Internal
Revenue Code. Citing authority to the effect that the election to file
a consolidated return is binding and cannot be revoked to effect a
tax saving,0 7 the court held that it was without power to grant the
relief requested by the debtor.
In Mullen v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. ,20 the court rejected
the argument that a judgment lien founded upon a nondischar-
geable debt is not subject to the preference provisions of section 67a
of the Act."0 9 The trustee sought to invalidate a judgment lien ob-
tained by a title insurance company against the bankrupt. The
bankrupt was insolvent when the judgment was obtained, and the
judgment was obtained within four months of the initiation of bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
The trustee sued to have the judgment lien declared null and
void as a preference under section 67a. The judgment lienor argued
that, while judgment lien preferences were normally avoidable by
the trustee, when the lien was founded upon a nondischargeable
debt, the preference provisions did not apply. The judgment lienor
argued further that the debt supporting the judgment was founded
upon fraud and would be nondischargeable under sections 17a(2)
and (4) of the Act."' °
Without citation of authority, the court held that section 67a
does not have any limitation based upon the dischargeability of the
debt upon which the judgment lien was obtained. The court empha-
sized that section 17 does not state that judgment liens based on
207. See Manchester Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1008 (1936).
208. 9 C.B.C. 45 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
209. Section 67a provides in pertinent part:
Liens and Fraudulent Transfers
(1) Every lien against the property of a person obtained by . . . judgment
. . . within four months before the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding
under this Act by or against such person shall be deemed null and void (a) if at
the time, when such lien was obtained such person was insolvent . ...
210. Section 17a of the Act provides:
Debts Not Affected by a Discharge
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts . . . except such as . . . (2) are liabilities for obtaining money or property
by false pretenses or false representations . . . (4) were created by his fraud . ..
while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity . . ..
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such debts are not affected by section 67a. The court distinguished
between section 17, which refers to debts, and section 67a, which
refers to liens.
The court's rejection of the lienor's argument seems eminently
correct. Section 67a serves the sole purpose of allowing the bank-
ruptcy trustee to avoid the effect of a judgment lien upon the estate.
It invalidates only the lien, not the obligation or debt upon which
the lien is founded."' The section also only operates to invalidate
liens that are created by a judgment. It does not operate where the
judgment is obtained to enforce a preexisting statutory or common
law lien."'
Thus, the judgment lienor whose lien is avoided by the trustee
still can file a proof of claim and share in distribution to the extent
provided in the plan. If not barred by discharge, the judgment lienor
can enforce his judgment under the appropriate state law after
bankruptcy.
Although decisions are few, and none were cited by the Mullen
court, the courts which have faced the question have reached a
similar result."' However, an early Fifth Circuit decision contained
an indication to the contrary." '
211. In re Wesley Corp., 18 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Ky. 1937).
212. Ricotta v. Burns Coal & Bldg. Supply Co., 264 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1959); New York
Brooklyn Fuel Corp. v. Fuller, 11 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1926); In re Chesterfield Dev., Inc., 285
F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); In re Van Meter, 135 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Ark. 1956); In re
Wesley Corp., 18 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Ky. 1937).
213. Wagler v. Mt. Carmel Iron Works, 270 F. 80 (3d Cir. 1921); Bear v. Chase, 99 F.
920, 921 (4th Cir. 1900); In re Green, 179 F. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1910).
214. Westmoreland v. Dodd, 2 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 595 (1924).
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